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We present a model of vine-growing specialization that explains the key agricultural change carried 
out before and throughout the Catalan industrialization. The results confirm the role played by a 
“Smithian” market-pull force exerted from the Atlantic demand, together with the “Boserupian” 
population-push on land-use intensification. They jointly put in motion a process of opening and 
closing of an inner frontier of vineyard planting, whose local impact was conditioned by the agro-
ecological endowments as well as to the different levels and trends of income inequality. Vineyard 
planting gave rise to less inequality up to the 1820s, but it grew again afterwards. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We present an intensive frontier model to explain vine-growing specialization in Catalonia, and the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona, which is deemed to be the key agricultural change that 
preceded and accompanied industrialization. This is a relevant case, given that the province of 
Barcelona was the earliest industrialized region in Southern Europe. In 1860, industry contributed 
37 per cent of value added and employed 32 per cent of active population, compared with 47 
percent in the UK and 24 percent in the whole of France. With 1,847 per capita GDP (1990 GK 
$US), the Barcelona province ranked above the average figures of Germany (1,639) or Austria 
(1,778) and just below France (1,892) of the time.  
 
Table 1. Comparative levels of GDP pc in different European nations and the province of Barcelona in 1860 
Nations or regions GDP pc 1860  
($US 1990 Geary Khamis) 
Population (x 1,000) 
United Kingdom 2,830   28,888 
Netherlands 2,377     3,318 
France 1,892   37,300 
Barcelona province 1,847       726 
Austria 1,778     4,235 
Switzerland 1,745     2,510 
Germany 1,639   36,049 
Catalonia 1,415    1,674 
Spain 1,236   15,642 
Sweden 1,195    3,824 
Source: Our own, based on (Rosés et al., 2010; Maddison, 2010).  
 
In spite of being a small sprout that remained rather isolated, its success becomes particularly 
interesting precisely because of being an early industrializing exception in a Mediterranean 
environment where the typical mixed farming of the Atlantic bioregion was not feasible due to the 
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lack of precipitation and soil moisture (González de Molina, 2005). Vine-growing offered away out 
to these agro-ecological constraints and became the most important agricultural transformation 
behind the industrial growth of Catalonia, to which it contributed by increasing the purchasing 
power of cheap textiles in the domestic market; by generating landowner’s savings that helped to 
finance the new cotton factories; and as a relevant export item that allowed to purchase raw 
materials and machinery abroad (Sánchez and Nadal, 1998a; Sudria and Pascual, 1999; Valls-
Junyent 2007; Marfany, 2010; Marfany, 2012). 
Our model tries to understand how this comparative advantage arose from a set of interrelated 
factorsnamely the environmental endowments, the connection with the Atlantic trade, the push of 
population growth toward more intensive land uses, and the evolution of income inequality. In the 
following sections, we will contrast the stylized facts of this historical process with some static 
theoretical insights, such as Hecksher–Ohlin and Stolper–Samuelson models. Amore dynamic view 
will be adopted, based on the process of opening and closing of an inner frontier of vineyard 
planting that moved along the Ricardian intensive margin of the prevailing agricultural system. 
 
2. An inner-frontier model of vineyard spread 
 
Grape vines had been grown in Catalonia for many centuries before becoming a cash crop. They 
were traditionally planted as a temporary cultivation in former small plots of woodland or scrub 
slashed and burnt (a task called rabassa in Catalan), until the vines became too old and the vineyard 
was left to be reforested. Another crop pattern consisted of planting sparse rows of vines with 
strips of arable land in between, which were alternatively sown with grains or left fallow. These 
traditional vine-growing had long existed as a complementary side into many Mediterranean poly-
cultural landscapes that produced wheat, wine and olive oil in poly-cultural landscapes mainly 
oriented to local markets. As in other European places, there were several inner regions of Spain 
where land was mainly allocated to this kind of traditional viticulture that sold wine to other grain-
growing, livestock raising, or fish-catching areas—such as the lands along the Duero River, La Rioja 
and Navarra that traded with the Northern Cantabrian coast, or in Castilla-La Mancha that supplied 
wine to Madrid (Ringrose, 1970; Pan-Montojo, 1994; Simpson, 1995; Carmona et al., 2001; 
Simpson, 2011). High transportation costs before the fossil fuels era entailed that most of these 
wines were only traded regionally ( Simpson, 2011). 
Other Mediterranean coastal places exported to the North Atlantic economy luxury wines like in 
Malaga, Jerez, or Porto. However, while the British consumption of these port-like wines remained 
flat from 1815 to 1914, the imports of cheap Spanish white table wines soared from some 7 million 
hl in  1825 to nearly 30 million hl in 1875 (Simpson 2011). Catalonia produced and sold these 
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kinds of cheap liquors and wines oriented toward a massive elastic demand, able to carry out a deep 
transformative process in the regional economy with low entry barriers 
This export-led spread of new vineyards started at the end of the 17th century, when the Dutch 
trade connected the Western Mediterranean coast with the emerging Atlantic economy (Torras, 
1996; Valls-Junyent, 2003), and increased during the 18th and 19th centuries until the Phylloxera 
Plague, which initially fostered new plantations from 1867 onwards before ravaging all Catalan 
vines from 1879 to 1890. In 1858 there were 115,454 hectares of vineyards in the province of 
Barcelona, which accounted for 51 per cent of farmland to which some additional 16,000 hectares 
were added until the Phylloxera crisis (Badia-Miró et al., 2010). Vineyards were planted through an 
almost-emphyteutic contract called rabassa morta (as the sharecropping was meant to come to an end 
when two-thirds of the vines had died), being offered by the landowners to small growers with little 
or no land of their own (Vilar, 1962; Giralt, 1965; Balcells, 1980; Carmona and Simpson, 1999; 
Colomé, 2000; Garrabou et al., 2000; Badia-Miró et al., 2010). 
 
2.1. Long-term trends in relative prices   
 
At first sight, the theoretical background underlying this historical narrative could be considered an 
applied version of the Heckscher–Ohlin model. According to it, vine-growing specialization would 
have developed in those Catalan municipalities with more favourable factor endowment to meet 
the increasing foreign demand for liquors and wines. However, this is a static theorem that requires 
a strong ceterius paribus assumption. We are instead talking about a long-term historical process of 
dynamic specialization that cannot be simply understood as a punctual reallocation of land and 
labor endowments according to more profitable options to trade abroad. We know, for instance, 
that from 1680 to 1935 the relative price of Catalan wines in terms of wheat did not always evolve 
in favorable terms to replace cereal lands with vineyards (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Relative prices of wine in terms of wheat sold in Catalonia from 1680 to 1935 (with an eleventh-years 
moving average) 
 
 
Source: (Colomé et al., 2013). 
 
The long-termevolution in the terms of trade (see figure 1), and its high volatility in the short term, 
set the level of risk assumed by vine-sharecroppers who, after giving up self-sufficiency, had to buy 
their staple food in the market with the cash earned selling grape vintages. It is very significant that 
the planting of vines through rabassa morta contracts did not stop, but even increased during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, or in the 1830 and 1850s, in spite of the falling trend 
experienced by the relative prices of wine (Tello, 1995; Garrabou et al., 2009; Garrabou et al., 2010; 
Colomé et al. 2013).  
 
2.2. Combining Smithian pulling and Boserupian pushing forces in a vine-planting frontier 
 
Figure 2 outlines the set of variables and conditioning factors we propose to consider in our model. 
It highlights the Boserupian pushing force of increasing population densities that triggered more 
intensive land uses (Boserup, 1981; Boserup, 2005; Netting, 1993; Valls-Junyent, 1997; Hunt, 2000; 
Colomé at al., 2010). This, in turn, combined with the Smithian force exerted by a growing demand 
of cheap wines, and jointly induced a reallocation of land and labour towards vine-growing. The 
population-pushing and market-pulling forces had different impacts on the local land-use changes, 
depending on two other sets of conditioning factors, namely the specific agro-climatic endowments 
and the existence of a labour force ready to enter into tenancy contracts to grow vines. Some of 
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these factors can be regarded as naturally given, such as agro-climatic endowment. Others 
depended on human agency within a dynamic socioeconomic context, such as migrations and 
demographic behaviour, that changed population densities, or the readiness of many landless 
peasants to invest their labour force to turn poor sloping land into terraced vineyards. In other 
words, we are assuming an agency-oriented explanation of a historical process of land-use change 
fostered by the opening and closure of an inner vine-planting frontier. 
 
Figure 2. Pushing or pulling drivers and conditioning factors of Catalan vine-growing specialization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
Source: Our own, based in (Garrabou et al., 2009; Badia-Miró et al., 2010). 
 
What eventually mattered was the dynamic junction of these drivers and conditioning factors. The 
American and North European demand for spirits and wines pulled a new commercial type of 
winegrowing in Catalonia (Vilar, 1962; Valls-Junyent, 2003), while population growth made it 
necessary to adopt more intensive land-use patterns so as to overcome fallowing and get increasing 
incomes in smaller plots. This wine-exporting specialization brought about the most important 
change crop allocation experienced in Catalonia before and during industrialization, and it entailed a 
deep effect on the composition and evolution of foreign trade. From 1865 to 1889 1889, some 40 
percent of the total Spanish exports were vine products (Simpson, 1995; Torras, 1996; Carmona et 
al., 2001; Valls-Junyent, 2001; Valls-Junyent, 2003; Pinilla and Ayuda, 2007). This, in turn, led to 
relevant changes of rural income distribution in the Catalan economy. 
 
2.3. The rental–wage trends in vine-growing and cereal-cropping areas 
 
Which was the long-term relationship between income inequality and vine-growing specialization in 
Catalonia? While the opening of a vine-planting frontier offered a provisory way of access to land 
Conditional factors that modulated 
the local impact of driving forces 
pushing and pulling towards vine-
growing specialization: 
1. Agro-ecological land 
endowments 
2. Inequality in land 
ownership and tenure, or 
rural income distribution  
Push driving force: 
A. Increasing rural 
population  
densities  
(by population growth 
and immigration) 
Pull driving force: 
B. Increasing demand 
for brandy and wine 
exports    
(by integration to 
international markets) 
% of vineyards in farmland 
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for many poor landless peasants, the increasing reliance on distant markets affected the risks taken 
by vintners and had an impact on income distribution as well. Who in the end got the incomes 
gained through the spread of this cash crop? The answer is far from simple, and the available 
evidence is rather scant so far (Colomé, 2000). To fill this gap we have calculated the rental–wage 
ratio in two historical series carefully selected to correspond either to mainly cereal-growing or to 
vine-growing places. These Williamson’s indices are only aimed at highlighting the long-term trends 
of rural income inequality experienced in Catalonia, and by no means can be taken as an accurate 
account of the gains actually obtained by the rabassa tenants or their landowners. The key point is 
that, according to the available evidence, rental–wage ratios followed very different trends in vine-
growing lands than in grain-growing areas (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 4. Rental-wage ratios in cereal growing (left) and vine-growing (right) Catalan areas, 1720-1900 
 
Source: Our own.. For a detailed descrption, see appendix.  
 
During the economic depression after the Catalan defeat in the Succession War, (1701-1714) 
followed by the imposition of a cadastral land tax initially intended to collect war reparations from 
the vanquished kingdoms of the Aragon Crown, the payment of land rents dropped almost to 
nothing due to arrears—given that croppers delayed a great deal of rent payments until they were 
able to keep themselves abreast in the following years. The unskilled rural wages could not be 
further reduced instead, as they were near to a bare-bones subsistence level. This combination 
shrunk the rental–wage ratio for a while (Figure 3). Then, when the economic recovery during the 
1720s resumed the land rent levels previous to the war, the high relative prices of wine opened for 
the landowners a feasible way to resist the new tax burden by offering to landless people marginal 
plots to plant vineyards (Figure 1). In exchange with salted fish brought by Dutch traders from the 
Atlantic, the Catalan landowners were able to earn through the export of distilled spirits the cash 
they urgently needed. 
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In earlier times whenever these Catalan landowners required some amount of cash they used to 
resort to rabassa morta contracts. Their synchronized response from 1720 onwards opened a true 
Ricardian inner-frontier of land-use intensification pulled by the Smithian growth of the Atlantic 
economy. The rabassa morta practice avoided them the entire plantation costs, while the 
sharecropping terms of the contract allowed capturing the fast upswing of the rental–wage ratio 
that ensued from 1720 to 1740. We can wonder why then, after having put in motion a vine-
planting frontier, the Catalan landowners did not shift to a direct management by assuming 
themselves the cost of plantation and the farming of the vineyards by using day-laborers. This 
behavior can be related to the fall of rental–wage ratios that ensued after 1740 (Figure 3).1    
 
The advance of the Catalan vine-growing frontier was very impressive: at the end of the 18th 
century, two thirds of Spanish liquor exports came from Catalonia, and the other third from 
Valencia (Torras, 1996). Nevertheless, from 1740 onwards relative prices started to move against 
selling grapes to buy wheat (Figure 1) in a persistent trend that played a role in the following 
diverging paths in rental-wage ratios. While in cereal-growing areas Catalan landowners kept or 
even increased their land rents at the expense of croppers’ wages, in vine-growing places rental-
wage ratios experienced a significant downturn until the end of the 18th century (Figure 3).  
 
To what extent can we assume from these Williamson’s indices that income inequality decreased in 
vine-growing Catalan areas during most of the eighteenth century, while it was maintained or 
increased in cereal-growing lands? A rural class of laborers completely dependent of wage earnings 
was almost inexistent in Catalonia. The earners of the wages plotted in Figure 3 were mainly 
smallholders or landless sharecroppers who hired out their labour surpluses part-time. At the same 
time, the rabassa morta contracts entailed a sharecropping arrangement that linked the incomes 
gained by both sides to the fate of market prices and returns—albeit not in an equal manner. 
 
                                                     
1 A main reason that explains why day labourers were so seldom hired in Mediterranean arboriculture is moral 
hazard. Vines, like many other tree crops, can be heavily damaged if pruning, ploughing and hoeing are badly 
performed (Simpson, 2011). However, a relevant share of the Catalan landowners were also farmers that 
could rely on their family labour force to carry out these skilled tasks and only resort to day laborers during 
vintage, like many French vintners did after becoming owners of their vineyards after the Revolution.  
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
  .       
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Behind this question there lies the very complex social and agro-ecological fabric of this inner vine-
planting frontier opened in Catalonia, in which almost all parts involved made a living by 
assembling different kinds of incomes and earnings. Besides being sharecroppers and part-time 
labourers, some of these vine-growers could also have some plots of their own. As such, they could 
take a share over the total gains obtained through the export-led growth of wine spirits or table 
wines. But the general trend followed by their always mixed incomes had to be kept in line with the 
rental-wage ratios, at least to some extent, simply because these agricultural minimum wages were 
the opportunity costs taken into account for the landowners who leased rabassa morta contracts, as 
well as for the sharecroppers that accepted them. 
 
Keeping this in mind, we deem the persistent downward trend of income inequality from 1740 up 
to the end of the 18th century to be reliable, and also coherent with land-saving as well as a labor-
intensive biological innovation induced by the new Atlantic trade opportunities. However, as 
Hayami and Ruttan (1971) pointed out, the result in terms of income distribution always depends 
on what happened at the same time with population growth. During this first phase of the process, 
the Smithian market force would have pulled stronger to the advance of the vineyard frontier than 
the Boserupian pushing exerted by the increasing population densities in Catalan rural areas. While 
the Ricardian frontier of land being offered to new vine-growers advanced at similar or even faster 
pace than rural population densities, rental-wage ratios fell and income inequality was lowered in 
wine-growing areas compared with other places where land being devoted to grow cereals or to 
forestry did not expanded in the same way. Provided that the demand for liquors and wine was kept 
growing, landowners would go on offering new rabassa morta contracts even though they had to 
accept that the constant share taken over the sharecroppers’ vintage would be paid with lower 
relative prices and would led to relatively lower rents than in arable land sown with cereals from 
1740 to 1800. Under these circumstances, during most of the 18th century the export-led growth of 
viticulture helped to reduce income inequality in the Catalan vine-growing areas. 
 
2.4. A social and ecological geography of vineyards 
 
However, there seems to be something apparently odd about these trends. Why the Catalan 
landowners did not shift to grow cereals, instead of keeping on the offer of rabassa morta contacts to 
plant vines, once the relative price of wine in terms of wheat fell from 1740 to 1800? The answer is 
that they did both things (Garrabou et al., 2012). They allocated to cereal crops their own flatter 
and moister lands, and only leased to vine-growing sharecroppers tiny plots in the poorest, dryer 
and sloping soils less profitable to grow grains. Another relevant feature of this vineyard 
specialization was that the typical medium-size landholdings (called masies in Catalan) kept a poly-
cultural crop pattern that allowed the landowners to reduce risks by maintaining the option to enter 
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or exit the market depending on the circumstances (Pascual, 2000). Their sharecropper-vintners, on 
the contrary, found themselves completely at the mercy of market volatility. 
 
Therefore, we are talking about a partial vineyard specialization amidst a poly-cultural landscape far 
from a monoculture. This very important feature was also related to the shifting location of Catalan 
vineyards. In the province of Barcelona the vines started to be planted as an export cash-crop in the 
outskirts of the city and along the neighbouring coastal counties. From these littoral locations, the 
vine-growing frontier expanded across the pre-littoral corridor and towards the North, while at the 
same time many periurban landowners shifted again to cereal cropping from 1740 onwards (Vilar, 
1962; Badosa, 1985; Valls-Junyent, 1996; Paül, 2010). In mid-19th century there was a first 
agricultural ring around Barcelona and other cities devoted to grow vegetables and cereals, 
following a typical von Tünen pattern. The vineyards had been displaced towards many 
intermediate fringes between the cereal plains and forested mountains (Map 1). 
 
Map 1 - Municipal proportion of cropland allocated to vineyards in 1858 (left) and roughness of the land (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our own, from the Estadística Territorial (Muro et al., 2011) and digital elevation map. 
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As a result, while the province of Barcelona exported ever greater amounts of liquors and wine (a 
labour-intensive product), and imported wheat in return (a much more land-intensive product), a 
share of its own staple food was still locally grown. Circa 1860 the local production of cereals 
yielded about 15-16 hectolitres per hectare and was cropped in 44% of farmland, so that local 
production of food grains could fulfil 39% of the consumption. To cover the other 61%, one 
million hectolitres of wheat per year had to be imported (Map 2).  
 
Map 2 – Population densities and shortage or surplus degrees in cereal food production to meet local 
consumption in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona (1859-67) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our own, from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics (http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php) for the population data. 
We thank to the Barcelona Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies (IRMB-UAB) for facilitating the digital 
information on the road and rail networks in 1860. The dependence degrees on staple food imports have been drawn 
from the dataset compiled with the Estadístiques de la producció i consum de cereals als partits judicials de la província de Barcelona 
(National Library of Catalonia, Archive of the Commercial Board, lot CXXVI, boxes 163 and 164). 
 
2.5. The closure of the vine-planting frontier and the landowners’ reaction 
 
From the end of the 18th century up to the 1840s, the rental-wage ratio remained stable at its lowest 
level, whereas in cereal-cropping Catalan places grew from 1820 to 1830 and fell again to the 
previous level in 1840—a period when wheat imports were banned in Spain. We believe it was over 
this period that population growth started to overflow the absorption capacity of the Catalan vine-
11 
 
planting frontier. While this happened only in some villages, the surplus population could still 
migrate to other areas where the frontier remained open. But we guess that from the end of the 
eighteenth century onward the frontier moved increasingly slowly, and tended to stop during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century just before the two big vine-growing booms arrived in the 
1840 and 1870s. The rise in relative prices of firewood and charcoal, fostered by the deforestation 
ensuing vineyard spread, also tended to increase the opportunity cost of additional vine planting in 
forestlands. The following vine-planting cycles of the 1840–50 and 1870–80s could have hardly 
taken place without the increasing reliance on coal imports (Vilar 1962; Nadal et al. 2012).  
 
The closure of the vine-planting frontier tended to turn the former Boserupian relationship 
between population density and land-use intensification into a Malthusian one (Colomé et al., 
2010), unless industrial activities increasingly based in fossil fuels came to the rescue. Put in another 
way, during this second phase of the process the population pushing tended to overflow the pace 
of the Smithian pull, thus starting the closure of the Catalan vineyard frontier moving along a 
Ricardian intensive margin. As a result landowners increased their bargaining power against the 
vine-growers, and tried to change in their favour the prevailing terms of the rabassa morta contracts. 
To do so, the Catalan landowners took advantage of the liberal agrarian reforms being introduced 
in Spain. The duration of the contract and the rent share over the vintage became highly contested 
issues of a strong social conflict that lasted from the end of the eighteenth century until the end of 
the Spanish Civil War in 1939 (Balcells, 1980; Tello, 1997; Carmona and Simpson, 1999).  
 
The initial rabassa morta contracts established a very long lease that lasted until the vines’ death, and 
the sharecroppers took advantage of the traditional layering system to renew their vineyards 
(Simpson, 2011). This way, all vineyards could be kept alive, rendering their access to the land 
almost permanent. The landowners reacted by asking the courts to dictate a fixed term of fifty years 
for the completion of the contract, as was sentenced for the first time in 1765—a decision that lead 
to a first wave of protests by the rabassa morta sharecroppers along the crisis of the Catalan 
viticulture during the closing of liquor exports during the wars with France.  
 
The ensuing process of agrarian liberal reform opened or closed opportunity windows either for the 
rabassa morta sharecroppers or their landowners, depending on the political swing between 
democratic or oligarchic undercurrents. For three brief democratic moments, the Catalan vintners 
were near to attain their aim to become fully owners of the vineyards, like in France after the 
Revolution. In 1820 during the Liberal Triennium, and again in 1873 during the First Spanish 
Republic, laws were passed that offered to them the opportunity to redeem any kind of 
emphyteutic contracts still in force like the. In 1820 during the Liberal Triennium, and again in 
1873 during the First Spanish Republic, laws were passed that offered to the croppers the 
opportunity to redeem any kind of emphyteutic contracts still in force like the rabassa morta. Finally, 
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in 1934 the autonomous Catalan Parliament restored by the Second Spanish Republic passed a law 
that gave full satisfaction to the claims of the Unió de Rabassaires founded in 1922. However, all 
these democratic attempts were defeated by the absolutist restoration of 1823, the oligarchic 
parliamentary regime settled from 1873 onwards by the second monarchic restoration, and the 
fascist regime imposed by the general Franco in 1939.  
 
During the much longer periods ruled in a favourable manner for the landowners, the Civil Code of 
1851, finally approved and enforced in 1889, established a fixed term of 50 years for the new rabassa 
morta contracts and opened the way to evict the sharecroppers after the expiry of the tenancy. What 
has been called ‘denaturalization’ of the original rabassa morta contract ensued (Figures 4 and 5), 
followed by an increasingly stronger movement of protest by Catalan vine-growers. 
  
Figure 4. The substitution of rabassa morta contracts with a fixed lifespan in sharecropping 
leases during the nineteenth century in the Penede`s County. 
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Source: Colomé (2013). 
 
Figure 5. The average share of vintage paid to the landowner in the municipality of Piera 
 
 
Source: Valls-Junyent (1996). 
 
Once the difficulties of the Napoleonic Wars were overcome at the end of the 1820s, the Catalan 
viticulture thrived during a first boom of relative prices of wine during the Odium mildew in the 
1840s, and during a second boom from 1875 to 1885 when the Phylloxera plague had destroyed the 
French vineyards but not yet all the ones in Catalonia (Figure 1). The landowners faced these new 
market opportunities with lower land-labour ratios increasingly favourable to their bargaining 
power, which was also reinforced by the liberal agrarian reforms. It is hardly surprising that they 
were able to take almost all the gains of these upward trends in relative prices (Figures 4 and 5). 
Agricultural wages did not, and income inequality tended to increase again in Catalan vine-growing 
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areas throughout most of the 19th century. Conversely, in cereal-growing areas, land rents remained 
fairly stable while agricultural wages, which had been lower in the inland arid planes, tended to 
converge with coastal labour earnings from 1860 onward (Garrabou and Tello, 2002). 
  
The fall of the rental-wage ratios in cereal growing areas became even more pronounced by the 
effects of the overseas ‘grain invasion’ from 1870 onward (Offer, 1991; O'Rourke and Williamson, 
1999), a trend only partially offset by the devaluation of the Spanish currency followed by the 
strong protectionist tariffs of the 1890s (Figure 3). This downturn also helps to understand the 
strong clash for income distribution between farmers and landowners during the agrarian crisis of 
the turn of the century (Koning, 1994), when the rental-wage ratios fell both in cereal-growing and 
vine-growing areas. Most Catalan wealthy landowners tried to play with all the cards in the deck 
under the Spanish protectionist umbrella by keeping their farms poly-cultural ( Pascual, 2000). This 
behaviour had allowed them to download in a great deal the former downturns in relative prices of 
wine on the shoulders of their vine-growing sharecroppers, who were also part-time laborers. This 
was no longer possible when all agricultural prices started to fall. The increasing integration of 
labour markets could also raise a bit the opportunity cost and strengthen the bargaining capacity of 
vine-croppers at that time, some of whom renounced to their rabassa morta contracts voluntarily to 
search for a job in the nearby industrial factories.2 
 
Seen in a long-term historical perspective, the reaction of Catalan landowners after the closure of 
vine-planting frontier and the ensuing upward trends experienced by the rental-wage ratios (Figures 
3, 4 and 5) fit quite well with the strong social unrest and political polarization found within many 
Catalan rural communities which relied on viticulture during the second half of the 19th century and 
along the first third of the 20th century (Planas and Valls-Junyent, 2011; Planas, 2013; Colomé, 
2013).  We may consider that, together with Smithian, Ricardian and Boserupian variables, the 
Marxian driving force of class struggle also played a role in this process. 
 
2.6. Long-term impact of the vine-planting frontier: a fall and rise of rural inequality 
 
The results found in the long-term trends of Catalan rental-wage ratio (Figure 3) are at odds with 
the assumptions made by the Stolper-Samuelson model. Following a Heckscher-Ohlin approach, 
                                                     
2 An interesting aspect brought into light by our inner-frontier model of vineyard spread is the relationship 
between the offering of land tenancy contracts to plant vines and the opportunity cost of labouring people in 
industrial labour markets. Could it be that at the dawn of Catalan industrialization a vine-planting frontier that 
still remained open could have increased the opportunity cost of workers, helping to raise wages and the 
corresponding incentive to introduce labour-saving machinery? Conversely, could it be that once the vine-
planting frontier had definitely been closed, labour demand in an increasingly mature industry could have 
contributed to increase the bargaining power of vine-growers in the turn of the 19th century? Of course, both 
possibilities would depend on the degree of integration of labour markets. This aspect deserves a detailed 
study in future. 
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the Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that an increase in relative prices of a commodity will lead to 
a rise in the return to that factor more intensively used to produce it, and conversely, to a reduction 
in the return to the other less abundant factor (Lindert and Williamson, 2003; Williamson, 2011). 
As we are dealing with a highly labour-intensive cash crop, along with the reduction in the relative 
price of wine experienced from 1740 to 1800, we should have to expect a rise in the income get by 
the owners of less abundant land and a fall in the earnings of the more abundant labour. We have 
found exactly the opposite along most of the 18th century. Then, when relative prices rose again in 
favourable terms for wine from 1840 up to 1885, we should expect a fall in the income get by the 
owners of less abundant land and a rise in the earnings of an increasingly abundant labour. Again 
we found the opposite. 
 
This outcome can be explained by the static character of these models. They tell us what would 
have happened during the First Globalization (1870-1914) provided that the convergence in 
commodity prices, and the factors used to produce them, would not have been counteracted by 
other driving forces. However, they were counteracted in a great extent by the long-term dynamics 
set forth by the opening and closure of an inner frontier of vineyard land-use intensification that 
altered the bargaining power between landowners and croppers. Our frontier-led historical context 
renders the Stolper-Samuleson theorem much less relevant, and stresses the importance of regional 
diverging trends within nations—as (Greasley et al., 2007) and (Harley, 2007) point out in a special 
issue around this topic.3 
 
3. Data sets assembled and expected sign of each variable in mid-19th century 
 
Our inner-frontier model of land-use change combines what are called first-nature and second-
nature variables by Environmental Historians (Cronon, 1991) as well as by New Economic 
Geography (Krugman, 1993). While agro-climatic endowments are first-nature factors, the dynamic 
interaction between the other variables becomes a set of second-nature drivers—included time-
distances to the nearest seaport that we take as a proxy for the Smithian market-pulling force 
(Badia-Miró et al., 2010). What really matters is the combination between them in a dynamic 
process that entails the emergence of feedback loops (like the one that turned into Malthusian an 
initially Boserupian relationship between population growth and land-use change). This means that 
except for the pulling market force, all variables had to move along a specific range of values, 
higher than a minimum but not exceeding an upper level, so as to fit with the rest in an adequate 
economic factor endowment. 
                                                     
3 Some examples around the evolution of rental–wage ratios could be found in the special issue introduced by 
Harley (2007).. 
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According to this, vineyard specialization stopped when one or several key variables exceed certain 
threshold values, for example, attaining population densities higher than the ones capable to be 
sustained by a still mainly agrarian economy, or exhausting marginal lands available to plant 
vineyards. When that time came, people faced a dilemma. Either demographic surpluses started to 
emigrate towards other places or local economies started a structural change to more industrial 
activities—or, as it happened immediately after the Phylloxera crisis, the rural families adopted a fast 
demographic transition towards low birth rates (Colomé et al., 2010; Colomé and Valls-Junyent, 
2012). It would be great to carry out this analysis along several dates, in order to assess whether or 
not the relative weight of first-nature and second-nature variables changed throughout this long-
term historical process. Nevertheless, the available datasets only allow us to perform a cross-section 
analysis in the mid-19th century. 
 
The spatial distribution of vineyards in the province of Barcelona in 1858 (Map 1) shows that vine-
growing municipalities tended to be located either along the coast or covering the fringes between 
the flatter areas and the sloping hills in the pre-littoral corridor. We also observe a higher presence 
of vines in areas closer to Barcelona, and lower levels in the municipalities far from the coast—
although there was a first ring allocated for grains and vegetables around the outskirts of the city 
(Maps 1 and 2). Our model tries to explain these locations by relating the proportion of vineyards 
in the farmland with the values adopted by the rest of independent variables that appear in figure 2. 
 
In the context of a vine-planting frontier being extended by a long-term process of market 
integration of a staple export, the relationship between population growth and land-use change 
appears to be less obvious than expected. Up to a point, higher population densities fostered more 
intensive uses of the land, such as vine-growing, but further increases above a certain threshold 
could put an end to vineyard planting—not only because of the exhaustion of available land, but 
also due to the need to develop industrious or industrial activities that would increase labour costs. 
Moving beyond the city of Barcelona and its outskirts, population densities increased from nearly 
20 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1718 to more than 36 in 1787, and then doubled again to 64 
in 1857-1860. As a result, per capita land availability had reduced from more than five hectares per 
inhabitant to only one and a half in 140 years.  
 
Map 2 outlines that those municipalities with higher population densities in 1860, together with the 
capitals of the districts, were clustered in coastal zones around Barcelona, and spread along the 
rivers. Within this spectrum, an optimal population density for viticulture seems to have been 
between 25 and 65 inhabitants per km2 (Badia-Miró et al., 2010), a range that fits the upper 
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threshold for a rain-fed agricultural economy established by (Boserup, 1981). Only an urban–
industrial economy could host higher population densities, as was the case in the industrializing 
districts of the Barcelona province. According to these lower and upper thresholds, it is not the 
population density at a given date that allows us to capture the push driving force exerted by the 
Boserupian population pressure on land-use intensification. What becomes significant the increase in 
population densities between some lower and upper thresholds before the change in crop allocation. 
As we have already checked in earlier versions of the model (Tello et al., 2008), what becomes 
significant is the growth population experienced along a period of time before the levels of vine-
growing specialization we want to explain were laid down (Garrabou et al., 2009). Therefore, we use 
population increases from 1787 to 1860 as the Boserupian variable, although population densities in 
1787 and 1860 were also used as a contrast.  
 
Market access to a growing Atlantic and colonial economy became a key variable for the impact 
exerted by this Smithian pulling impulse in different municipalities through the extension of the 
vine-planting frontier. Our model assesses this pull effect using travel costs to the seaports, as 
measured in time distances before the arrival of railways. Map 3 shows the stylized isochronal 
curves to the nearest harbour (Mataró, Vilanova or Barcelona) during the first third of the 19th 
century.4 Before railroads, the location of every municipality had a deep impact on the economic 
access to foreign markets. Practically all inland trade had to be carried through cart roads and bridle 
paths. By comparing maps 1 and 3, the relationship between vine-growing locations and time 
distances to the seaports becomes apparent. 
 
Agro-climatic endowments acted as conditioning variables that mediated in the local responses to 
population-push and market5-pull drivers. Slope of the land (Map 1) and the texture of soils, 
rainfall, frost risk, solar radiation, together with altitude and average temperature determined the 
suitability of different lands for a range of possible crops (see Tello and Badia-Miró 2011)—as 
shown in some partial versions of our model (Garrabou et al. 2009). However, we always pointed 
out that income distribution was a missing variable in these earlier papers. Here we are offering 
what we consider to be a complete version thanks to having been able to include this key variable 
by founding and fully exploiting a wonderful source, the Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial 
published in 1852. This rather exceptional record lists the names of all owners of land, houses and 
livestock who were subjected to the cadastral tax. The document adds up the evaluation of their 
annual taxable incomes to obtain the corresponding tax burden of every municipality (Bravo 
                                                     
4 To compose the approximate map 3, we have linked the time-distance points with stylized isochronal lines. 
However, the data set used to test the model only uses the punctual information of the time-distances from 
one place to another following the cart tracks or bridle paths that existed in 1824-1838.  
5 A detailed discussion of this source could be found in Tello and Badia-Miró (2011). 
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Murillo, 1852). All results make it clear that in 1852, per capita land-related incomes were still lower 
in vine-growing municipalities compared with the ones mainly allocated to cereal cropping and 
forestry (Table 1). 
 
Map 3. Time distances to the nearest seaport using existing cart roads and bridle paths 
in the province of Barcelona in 1824-1838 
 
Source: Our own, from two itineraries published before the first Catalan railway was set up in 
1848 (Frigola, 1824; Anonymous, 1838), checked with other sources (Bertrán Soler, 1847) or 
authors (Vilar, 1962; Font, 1999; Pascual, 1999; Herranz-Loncán, 2007; Herranz-Loncán, 
2008). 
 
 
.  
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Table 1. Land-use profiles of inequality in agricultural wealth or income distribution in the municipalities of the 
province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
Prevailing land uses 
Gini indices of the 
cadastral valuation 
of property 
Extraction Ratios expressed as % of the 
actual Theil indices of agricultural income 
distribution, compared to the maximum 
Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) average median 
all municipalities with land-use data in 1858 68.2 69.8 24.9 
mainly winegrowing municipalities 64.7 65.2 22.0 
mainly cereal cropping  69.1 69.9 25.2 
mainly allocated to forestry uses of land 70.1 72.0 25.0 
Source: our own, calculated from the Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial of 1852 (Library of the University of 
Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13), the population census of 1857 (taken from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics,  
http://www.ced.uab.es/), and the Estadística Territorial compiled in 1858 (Muro et al., 2011). Theil indices, Extraction 
Ratios and the IPF have been calculated for the whole adult male population older than 21, and adding a minimum vital 
income of 1,500 Spanish reales a year (Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011). 
 
The comparison between the evidence given in Table 1 and Figure 3 leads to a clear distinction 
between levels and trends. The long-lasting spread of vineyards from the mid-17th century to the 
beginning of the 19th century through rabassa morta contracts seems to have reduced wealth and 
income inequality in winegrowing places, at least compared to cereal-cropping or forestry 
municipalities (Figure 4). As a result, circa 1850 vine-growing municipalities had lesser inequality 
levels than the rest. However, according to the trends seen in rental–wage ratios, in a given moment 
from 1790 to 1840 inequality started to rise again in vine-growing municipalities, whereas it 
diminished in grain-growing areas (Figure 3). 
 
The Gini indices in Table 1 also raise an interesting question: was the lower inequality level in land-
related incomes of vine-growing rural communities simply due to their relative poverty?6 To answer 
this question, we calculated the Theil index of an estimated agricultural income distribution 
including all adult males, and obtained the corresponding Extraction Ratios (ER) compared to a 
maximum Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) related to per capita income (Milanovic et al., 2011). 
The results confirm that not only agrarian income inequality was lower in vine-growing 
municipalities but extraction ratio as well. 
 
                                                     
6 Our Catalan profile of rural inequality fits the estimates made in the mid-18th century in France by François 
Quesnay, who attributed to vine-growing peasant-owners the lowest non-wage agricultural income in his 
Tableau Économique as pointed out by  Milanovic (2010). See also the observation that land distribution was 
more equitable in French vine-growing areas made by Labrousse (1990). Thanks to the revolution, French 
winegrowers became mainly property-holders, exactly the same status that rabassa sharecroppers sought in 
Catalonia. Compared with them, the Catalan vine-growers can only be considered as would-be peasants. 
Nevertheless, their legal and economic status was stronger than other tenants-at-will, or labour-tenants, that 
existed in several regions of Europe at the time, such as the statartorpare in Sweden, husmennene in Norway, 
husmaendene in Denmark, or heuerlinge in North-western Germany, as explained in Mörner, M. (1970) and  
Schlumbohm (1996). 
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The above contrast between levels and trends may help us to unravel a difficult conundrum. How 
can social unrest in vine-growing municipalities be explained, knowing that agricultural income was 
more evenly distributed in them than in any other area in the Barcelona province in the mid-
nineteenth century? The answer lies in the fact that inequality was actually rising again from 1840 
onward, thanks to the closure of the vine-planting frontier, whereas vine-growers tried to keep 
them lower through their lingering collective action. 
 
4. Running the model  
 
To test statistically the determinants of vine-growing specialization attained in mid-19th century the 
following model has been used: 
1 2 3 4 5 , 1· · · ·j j j j j t jVSup AGRCL MKAC INEQ POB                     (1) 
Where VSupj is the percentage proportion of cropland allocated to vineyards, AGRCLj are a set of 
agro-climatic variables which could affect vineyard specialization (slope, rainfall, altitude, soil 
quality, frost risk and agro-climatic suitability indices for growing grapevines), MKACj captures the 
Smithian-pull effect through market access (either domestic or foreign) as assessed by time 
distances to the seaport of Barcelona. INEQj captures income inequality considering Theil indices 
of income inequality for adult male population as a whole, corrected with a subsistence wage 
income for all working-age men. To improve the robustness of the estimation we tried using 
Inequality Extraction Ratio, Theil index with no corrections and Gini index, but no better results 
were obtained. To capture the Boserupian-push we consider a set of population variables, POBj,t-1, 
i.e., the population rate growth for each municipality between 1787 and 1860, population density at 
the beginning and at the end of the period. Table 4 summarize the main statistics of the variables 
used in this exercise. 
 
Finally, a few dummy variables were considered: one for those municipalities which were capital 
districts, another for those with population densities greater than 70 inhabitants/km2. In both cases 
we are assessing the impact of more urban and diversified economies on vine-growing 
specialization, and a negative sign ought to be expected. We have also considered a dummy to 
search for a possible positive effect of municipalities having the King as manor, instead of having a 
member of the nobility or the Church before the manorial system was abolished in 1836—provided 
that this could entail a more flexible institutional framework. 
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Table 2. Main statistic of the variables 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Unit 
Vineyard Specialization 0.418 0.000 0.954 0.318 Percentage 
Population growth 
1787-1860 
0.90 -2.60 3.20 0.80 Percentage 
Population density 1787 75.25 2.90 1182.71 143.09 Inhab./km^2 
Population density 1860 114.99 8.068 2463.83 226.11 Inhab./km^2 
Rainfall 687.08 525.00 1093.81 108.58 Millimetres 
Slope 11.58 1.011 39.70 6.62 Percentage 
Altitude 375.44 3.00 1395.00 288.69 Metres 
Distance to Barcelona 11.99 0.00 33.00 6.87 Hours 
Male inequality (Theil) 0.028 0.000 0.101 0.018 - 
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Table 5. Explaining vine-growing specialization in the province of Barcelona in the mid-19th century 
 
TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT OLS OLS - Only Vineyard OLS Spatial LAG - Only Vy 
Constant 1.003 0.114 *** 1.238 0.110 *** 1.214 0.110 *** 1.009 0.072 *** 0.809 0.065 *** 0.084 0.051 * 
Population growth 
1787_1860 10.434 1.884 ***   
 
     7.347 1.440 *** 6.015 1.640 *** 3.797 1.150 *** 
Population density 
1787   
 
    
 
  3.764E-04 1.012E-04 ***   
 
    
 
    
 
  
Population density 
1860   
 
  -2.004E-04 5.137E-05 ***      
 
    
 
    
 
  
Rainfall -2.620E-04 1.392E-04 * -2.391E-04 1.359E-04 *** -2.746E-04 1.352E-04 **   
 
    
 
    
 
  
Slope 0.007 0.003 **   
 
  0.005 0.003 * 0.008 0.002 *** 0.006 0.003 ** 0.037 0.006 *** 
Slope2                -0.001 0.000 *** 
Altitude -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -4.000E-04 6.200E-05 *** 
Distance to Barcelona -0.009 0.004 ** -0.010 0.003 ** -0.009 0.004 ** -0.010 0.003 *** -0.007 0.004 *   
 
  
Male inequality (Theil) -3.748 0.860 *** -5.135 0.984 *** -5.018 0.965 *** -3.032 0.653 *** -3.571 0.776 *** -1.156 0.537 ** 
Capital districts 
(dummy) 0.200 0.070 ***   
 
     -0.124 0.065 *   
 
    
 
  
King as a manor 
(dummy)          -0.091 0.027 *** -0.059 0.032 *    
Municipalities >70 
inhab./Km2 -0.062 0.037 * -0.147 0.038 ***      
 
  -0.074 0.034 **   
 
  
    
 
             
 
    
 
    
 
  
n 292  292 292 292 229 229 
X2 (8) 472.443 316.303 391.209   
 
    
 
  
  
  
Log-likelihood -30.605 -37.646 -37-563 56.717 44.364 94.547 
Adjusted R-squared     
 
  
 
     0.583 0.350 0.639 
Schwarz criterion 117.977 120.706 126.217 -68.020 -45.258   
 
  
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000   
 
    
 
    
 
  
Akaike criterion 81.209 91.292 93.126 -97.434 -72.728 -175.094 
Hannan-Quinn 95.937 103.074 106.381 -85.652 -61.646   
 
  
sigma 0.234 (0.010) 0.242 (0.011) 0.240 (0.0098)                   
 
Note: t-ratios are in cursive; ***1, **5, or *10% statistical confidence interval. OLS, ordinary least squares. OLS – Spatial Lag, ordinary least squares considering spatial lags to correct spatial 
autocorrelation biases. 
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Population growth rates between 1787 and 1860 were significant and with the expected sign, so 
that municipalities with higher rates of population increase before 1860 had higher shares of 
farmland allocated to vineyards in this date. This confirms the Boserupian-push effect which 
favoured more labour-intensive crops. The significance of dummy variables related to capital 
districts or having population densities higher than 70 inhab./km2 also suggest the existence of an 
upper threshold of some 65 inhab./km2, a figure above which the population push ceased to foster 
vine-growing. In order to better capture this higher threshold, we have also considered population 
densities in 1787 and 1860.No better results were obtained, coefficients were significant, but the 
positive sign obtained in 1787 turned into a negative sign in 1860 (tables 3 and 4). This suggests 
that in the mid-nineteenth century the range of population density suitable for growing vineyards 
had already been attained or even surpassed in most areas of the province of Barcelona with 
appropriate agro-ecological endowments. Further population increases above that upper threshold 
entailed a negative impact in vine-growing, thus turning a Boserupian push into a Malthusian 
overflow. This is a very relevant result that allows us solving the existence of endogeneity problems 
associated with population variables, given that we can predict from our frontier-led model when a 
positive or negative sign can be expected.  
 
The market access pull, as measured with time-distances to Barcelona, is always significant and 
negative except when spatial autocorrelation is considered, thus confirming the Smithian-pulling 
force of foreign market access in vineyards’ spread. The joint impact of these drivers on local land-
use changes depended upon other sets of conditioning factors: Agro-ecological suitability and 
income inequality. No surprises appear when using agro-climatic variables. Rainfall levels are 
significant and negative, indicating vines were planted in drier lands while moister ones were 
reserved to cereals and vegetables. The same happens with altitude. Frost risk is significant and 
positive. Slope is also significant and negative, and the square of the slope has a negative sign 
showing that it has a decreasing positive impact. All these results confirm that vineyards were 
planted as a second-best choice in poorer and sloping lands which were less suitable for grain—but 
not as much as in brushwood and pastures.  
 
We have also repeated the estimates considering the municipal helio-thermal values taken with the 
Huglin index and the Winkler and Amerine ETI, which are expected to capture the better locations 
for planting grapevines. Coefficients are not significant, thus reinforcing again the conclusion that 
vineyard locations cannot be simply explained as a resource allocation owing to agro-climatic 
endowments. It was the interaction between the whole set of variables that put in motion an 
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agency-driven process that created a comparative advantage from the available resources by opening 
a long-lasting frontier of vineyard planting. 
An important leap forward of our model is to have included inequality as a relevant variable for the 
first time, and it appears to be significant and negative (Male inequality). That is, those municipalities 
with higher levels of income inequality tended to have lower vine-growing levels. Conversely, the 
ones with more even income distribution had higher proportions of vineyards in their farmland in 
the mid-19th century. To test the robustness of this result we have also considered income 
inequality values only for the cadastral valuation of the taxpayers’ properties, and extraction ratios. 
In all cases the result was the same, showing significant coefficients and the expected sign.7 
Finally, we have also run some regressions to correct possible spatial autocorrelation problems. As 
expected, spatial autocorrelation only appears in the impact of time-distances to Barcelona and for 
average municipal rainfall. All other variables maintain significant coefficients with the expected 
sign, reinforcing the robustness of the results obtained. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
By relying in the stylized facts provided by a very rich historiography, and adopting an inner-
frontier model of vineyard planting, we have been able to identify a set of interrelated variables that 
pushed, pulled or conditioned the Catalan process of vine-growing specialization. Aimed to explain 
a unique historical process, the analysis also helps to reveal some underlying mechanisms that may 
have played a role in other cases of agricultural change before and during industrialization—or just 
the opposite. It tries to understand how a comparative advantage was actually created through an 
agency-driven process. People acted in Catalonia according to the range of opportunities and 
resources they had. However, their agency also changed this context and opened new opportunities 
that altered the prevailing factor endowment by developing second-nature resources from the first-
nature ones. 
As in any other dynamic process, this vineyard specialization generated feedback loops and turning 
points that lead to a reverse causation among some of the variables considered, something that 
entails assuming endogeneity problems. The main way to deal with them has been testing the model 
as a cross-section analysis of spatial locations of vineyards in the mid-19th century—which is the 
only time-cut with enough historical sources. The cross-section test ‘freezes’ the dynamic process in 
                                                     
7 We have also analysed the weight that each term of the equation has in the final outcome. The result reveals 
that geographical variables such as altitude, rainfall or slope have a slightly greater impact than the others. 
Among the agency-oriented variables, inequality and market access stand out over the impact of population 
push. 
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this specific time-cut, for which our frontier model can predict the expected sign of each variable. 
Put in this way, “cross-sections are history” (Easterly 2013).  
Our results confirm the prime role played by the Smithian market-pulling force combined with the 
Boserupian population-pushing effect, the two main drivers of land-use change that moved ahead a 
vine-planting inner frontier. What stands out most from these results is the fact that Catalan 
vineyard specialization cannot be explained as a simple market-driven resource reallocation, 
undertaken only according to a given set of agro-climatic features. The active development of 
second-nature factors was very important, thus confirming the role played by socio-institutional 
settings and socio-political conflicts related with income inequality. While in the mid-19th century 
vineyard spread had led to a less unequal rural society, it was also growing faster there than 
anywhere. This allows explaining why the rabassa morta sharecroppers fought so fiercely during the 
second half of nineteenth century and up to the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). 
 
True, these Catalan sharecroppers did not become whole owners of the vineyards—except during a 
while when the Catalan Tenancy Act was passed in 1934, just before the Franco’s dictatorship 
abolished it in 1939. But their struggle was not in vain, and obtained other side-results that were far 
from negligible. By transforming into vineyards a previous landscape of brushwood and 
forestlands, ºthese rabassa morta vitners not only opened a gateway for themselves within Catalan 
villages and towns. They also gained a place in society and a share of its income. By increasing 
population numbers and deepening the home market, this helped to turn Catalonia eventually into a 
late-modern industrious society and an early-contemporary industrial economy. 
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Appendix 
 
Sources: Our own, based on population census taken from Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics 
(http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php). 
Rental-wage ratio 
An approximation to the ratio between landowners’ rents earned and one of the various incomes of 
less-skilled agrarian workers (who earned these wages + other income derived from their own work 
in small plots of land owned by them, or leased through a “rabassa morta” contract…). We have     
obtained data for two zones: 
Mainly vine-growing 
1. Rent payments in kind corresponding to sharecropping portions of wine, converted into 
pesetas, taken from “Parceries de les Torres de l’Hospital, 1720-1799, i de les Torres de 
Badalona, Cornellà i Esplugues” by Vilar (1965, p. 595 i 604–605), for the period 1720–
1777. 
2. Sharecropping rents of wine converted into pesetas from “Parceries de les Torres de 
l’Hospital, 1720-1799, de les Torres de Cornellà, Esplugues i El Prat” by Vilar (1965, p. 595 
i 604–605), for the period 1726–1799. 
3. Rents paid in cash to the Marquis of Sentmenat by his administrators of the estates in 
Palau de Plegamans, for 1788-1822, in Garrabou et al. (2001). 
4. Rents paid in cash to the Marquis of Sentmenat by his administrators of the estates in 
Palau de Plegamans, for 1821-1898, in Garrabou et al. (2001). 
5. Series of non-skilled agricultural wages, out of peak seasons, taken from Garrabou and 
Tello (2002). We have considered here wages for coastal places. 
We have transformed all the series into pesetas. For (1) and (2) we have considered the annual 
sharecropping portions of wine paid as rents in kind given by Vilar (1965). We have transformed to 
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hl considering: 1 càrrega of wine = 1,214 l following (Feliu, 1991, p. 18). Then we have converted 
this rent paid in kind into cash value in pesetas using wine prices from Colomé et al. (2013). For the 
series (3) and (4) we have considered that 1 lliura = 0,377358 pessetes (1 lliura = 20 sous; 1 sou = 0,53 
rals; 1 peseta = 4 rals). The resulting figures has been smoothed considering 9 years moving averages 
and transformed to index numbers considering 1740=100. Rental series resulted from the average 
of this index numbers. To obtain nominal rental series we have considered the average for series (1) 
and (2), in 1740. 
Mainly cereal-growing 
1. Annual rent payments in kind corresponding to sharecropping portions of wheat, in 
quarteres, transformed into cash value in pesetas, for the “Parceries de les Torres de 
l’Hospital, 1720-1799, de les Torres de Badalona, Cornellà i Esplugues” given by Vilar 
(1965, p. 595 i 604–605), for the period 1720–1777. 
2. Annual rents paid in cash (in lliures) to the landowner corresponding to the sharecropping 
portion of the harvest get in his estates in the Plana de Vic, given by Sudrià (1979), for the 
period 1730-1838. 
3. Sum of the annual cash rents paid (in lliures) to the owner of five small plots (sorts) and the 
lands included in a wheat mill in Cervera (La Segarra, inland Catalonia, sometimes 
irrigated), for the period 1744-1803 and 1808-1810, given by Tello (1995a, 1995b). 
4. Annual cash rents paid to the landowner of a estate in the Urgell (inland Catalonia) for 
1835–1900 given (in pesetas) by Garrabou et al., (2001). 
5. Series of non-skilled agricultural wages, out of peak seasons, taken from Garrabou and 
Tello (2002). We have considered here wages for inland places. 
We have transformed all series into the Spanish currency pesetas. For (1) we have considered the 
fresh weight in quarteres transformed to lliures following Vilar (1965), and have transformed the 
lliures into pesetas considering the equivalences of 1 lliura = 0,377358 pesetes. For (2), (3) and (4) 
we have converted the lliures into pesetes considering that equivalence. The resulting figures has 
been smoothed considering 9 years moving averages and transformed to index numbers 
considering 1740=100. Rental series resulted from the average of this index numbers. To obtain 
nominal rental series we have considered the average for series (1) and (2), in 1740. 
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Sources: Our own, obtained from series of land rents in vine-growing or grain-growing Catalan 
areas published by several authors (Vilar 1962; Ferrer 1987; Vicedo 1991; Tello 1995; Sudrià 
1979; Pascual 2000; Garrabou et al. 2001), divided by the series of agricultural wages 
reconstructed by Garrabou and Tello (2002). 
 
 
